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Abstract
Background: In early 1990s, Tanzania like other African countries, adopted health sector reform (HSR). The 
most strongly held centralisation system that informed the nature of services provision including health was, thus, 
disintegrated giving rise to decentralisation system. It was within the realm of HSR process, user fees were introduced 
in the health sector. Along with user fees, various types of health insurances, including the Community Health Fund 
(CHF), were introduced. While the country’s level of enrolment in the CHF is low, there are marked variations among 
districts. This paper highlights the role of decentralised health management and leadership practices in the uptake of 
the CHF in Tanzania. 
Methods: A comparative exploratory case study of high and low performing districts was carried out. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with the members of the Council Health Service Board (CHSB), Council Health 
Management Team (CHMT), Health Facility Committees (HFCs), in-charges of health facilities, healthcare providers, 
and Community Development Officers (CDOs). Minutes of the meetings of the committees and district annual 
health plans and district annual implementation reports were also used to verify and triangulate the data. Thematic 
analysis was adopted to analyse the collected data. We employed both inductive and deductive (mixed coding) to 
arrive to the themes.
Results: There were no differences in the level of education and experience of the district health managers in the two 
study districts. Almost all district health managers responsible for the management of the CHF had attended some 
training on management and leadership. However, there were variations in the personal initiatives of the top-district 
health leaders, particularly the district health managers, the council health services board and local government 
officials. Similarly, there were differences in the supervision mechanisms, and incentives available for the health 
providers, HFCs and board members in the two study districts. 
Conclusion: This paper adds to the stock of knowledge on CHFs functioning in Tanzania. By comparing the best 
practices with the worst practices, the paper contributes valuable insights on how CHF can be scaled up and maintained. 
The study clearly indicates that the performance of the community-based health financing largely depends on the 
personal initiatives of the top-district health leaders, particularly the district health managers and local government 
officials. This implies that the regional health management team (RHMT) and the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (MoHSW) should strengthen supportive supervision mechanisms to the district health managers and health 
facilities. More important, there is need for the MoHSW to provide opportunities for the well performing districts to 
share good practices to other districts in order to increase uptake of the community-based health insurance. 
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Implications for policy makers
• The regional health management team (RHMT) and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) should strengthen supportive 
supervision mechanisms to the district health managers.
• The MoHSW should provide opportunities for the well performing districts to share good practices to other districts in order to increase uptake 
of the community-based health insurance. 
• The MoHSW and the Ministry responsible for regional administration and local government need to make sure that incentives to the health 
providers, Health Facility Committees (HFCs) and board members are available and paid in time. 
Implications for the public
In order to effectively implement community-based health insurance, there is need to actively engage all stakeholders, including the public in the 
implementation of policies at the local level. The public, through health facility (user) committees should actively participate in monitoring the 
availability of quality health services in the health facilities. 
Key Messages 
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Introduction
In early 1990s, Tanzania like other African countries, 
adopted health sector reform (HSR). The most strongly held 
centralisation system that informed the nature of services 
provision including health was, thus, disintegrated giving rise 
to decentralisation system.1 It was within the realm of HSR 
process, user fees were introduced to raise additional revenue 
for health systems. User fees are charges levied at the point of 
service use and are supposed to reduce frivolous consumption 
of health services, increase quality of services available and, 
in turn, increase utilisation of services.2 The introduction of 
user fees in the health sector reduced people’s access to health 
services, especially the poor and the most vulnerable groups 
of the society.2-5 To offset the negative effects of user fees, many 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have introduced 
various types of health insurance schemes, including 
community-based health insurance (CBHI). CBHI schemes 
are noted for the principal role of a community’s involvement 
in raising, pooling, allocating, purchasing, and supervision 
of the health financing arrangement. Their beneficiaries are 
individuals with no form of financial protection or ability 
to cover the cost of healthcare services and the schemes are 
voluntary in nature.6 While CBHI schemes are criticised for 
the limited extent of resource generation and pooling, they 
have been shown to facilitate and improve access to healthcare 
services, especially among children and pregnant women7,8 as 
well as the rural poor and informal workers.9 
Based on the potential benefits of the CBHI scheme, the 
government of Tanzania officially introduced Community 
Health Fund (CHF) through Act No 1 of 2001.10 According 
to the CHF Act, the objectives of the fund are to: mobilise 
financial resources from the community for provision of 
healthcare services to its members; provide quality and 
affordable healthcare services; and improve healthcare services 
management in the communities.10 The scheme started 
operating in 1996 as a pilot study in Igunga district. The CHF 
membership is given on voluntary basis in which a household 
contributes an annual payment. The annual payment for the 
household is defined by the respective districts. The amount 
paid by the household entitles a particular household to a basic 
package of health services at a primary healthcare facility and 
hospital level in some districts.11 The funds collected by the 
district are doubled by a “matching grant” from the central 
government.12,13 Poor households which are unable to pay are 
supposed to be issued CHF membership card or an exemption 
letter.10 The powers to issue exemptions is vested into the 
Ward Health Committee after receiving recommendations 
from the village council.10 At the district level, the CHF is 
managed by the Council Health Service Board (CHSB) with 
representatives from the district authorities, public healthcare 
providers, private healthcare providers, and the community. At 
the ward and village level, the Ward and Village Development 
Committees, respectively, and the Health Facility Committees 
(HFCs) are responsible for mobilising people to join the CHF, 
overseeing premium collections, evaluating CHF operations 
and granting exemptions to poor households which are 
unable to pay.11 The ministry responsible for health and the 
ministry responsible for local government are required to 
provide advice and technical support to the fund and monitor 
and evaluate the activities of the fund.10 
Over the past decade, several systematic reviews that assessed 
the impact of the CBHI schemes on health status, the use of 
health services and financial protection have reported mixed 
results.14-17 In some case, these schemes have provided some 
form of reductions in out-of-pocket payments14 while in 
other cases there is no significant impact on out-of-pocket 
payments, the use of health services or health status.17 
Likewise, in Tanzania studies that have assessed the 
performance of the CHF schemes have reported mixed results. 
In some districts in Tanzania, CHF has managed to provide 
financial protection against health shocks to their members 
by reducing the level of out-pocket payment for healthcare.18 
Despite these achievements, the country level enrolment rate 
has remained as low as 9.2%.19 
The widely cited factors for the low enrolment in CHF include 
low economic status of the households20-22; poor quality of 
health services in the health facilities, particularly shortage 
of drugs, lack of essential medical supplies, lack of diagnostic 
equipment, and long waiting hours among others.23,24 
Although studies indicate that CHF in Tanzania is ineffective 
in its implementation, there are wide variations between 
districts.11,25 Some districts have recorded higher performance 
in terms of enrolment relatively above the national average, 
and other districts are still far below the national average. 
High performing districts are but not limited to Iramba 
(54%), Bariadi (40.9%), and Singida rural (27.2%). Districts 
with poor uptake of CHF in Tanzania include Liwale (8.0%), 
Rungwe (6.5%), and Iringa (10%). Other districts include 
Ulanga, Kyela, Lindi, and Mbinga.25,26
While studies that have assessed factors associated with 
uptake of CHBI exist, we are not aware of previous studies 
that have explored the role of leadership and management 
practices in the uptake of the CBHI schemes in LMICs. 
The recent systematic review reported that lack of funds, 
poor quality of healthcare, and lack of trust were the major 
reasons for low CBHI coverage in LMICs.27 This study, 
therefore, explored the role of management and leadership 
practices in the performance of CHF in the context of 
the decentralised health systems. Health managers, like 
other managers, perform four broad functions: planning, 
organising, leading, and controlling.28 While the debate about 
achieving universal health coverage in LMICs focuses more 
on financial constraints, there is increasing evidence that 
weak management and leadership capacity is a major obstacle 
to service delivery in many countries.29,30 This paper has the 
potential to advance knowledge on the role of leadership and 
management in the implementation of community-based 
health insurance schemes at this time when many LMICs are 
working towards progress to universal health coverage.
Methods
Study Settings 
Tanzanian Primary Healthcare Structure and Governance 
Tanzania operates a decentralised health system, organized 
around three functional levels: district (primary level), 
regional (secondary level), and referral hospitals (tertiary 
level). Within the framework of the ongoing local government 
reforms, regional and district councils have full responsibilities 
for delivering health services within their areas of jurisdiction, 
and report administratively to the Prime Minister’s Office 
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Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG).
The district councils have mandate for planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of health services. 
Each council has a District Medical Officer (DMO) who 
heads the Council Health Management Team (CHMT) and 
is answerable to the District Executive Director (DED), the 
head of the council. CHMTs are responsible for provision of 
services in dispensaries, health centres and district or district-
designated hospitals. The Regional Health Management Teams 
(RHMTs) are responsible for interpreting health policies at 
the regional level. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MoHSW) is responsible for policy formulation, supervision, 
and regulation for all health services throughout the country, 
as well as playing a direct role in the management of tertiary 
health services.
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) 
manages the overall revenue, expenditure, and financing. 
Its duties include preparing the Central Government 
budget and determining expenditure allocations to different 
Government institutions. The President’s Office, Public 
Service Management (PO-PSM) assists in matters of 
personnel and administration pertaining to public service in 
the entire government system. This includes responsibilities 
for personnel policies, administration and coordination of 
training and recruitment. 
Description of the Study Sites 
The study was conducted in Iramba and Iringa rural districts 
in Singida and Iringa regions, respectively. Table 1 summarises 
key characteristics of the study sites.
The Study Design 
The study adopted an exploratory case study design focusing 
on two districts one being a high performing district and the 
other being a low performing district. The CHF performance 
in this study refers to increased enrolments, retention of 
members, provision of benefit package to members, and 
management of the CHF funds. The exploratory case study 
is appropriate in investigating phenomena characterized by 
a lack of detailed preliminary research, especially formulated 
hypotheses that can be tested. This study design provided 
researchers with a high degree of flexibility and independence 
with regard to the data collection. The “high” and “poor” 
Table 1. Key Characteristics of the Study Settings
Iramba District Iringa District
Population 236 282 people 254 032 people
Population growth rate 2.3% 1.6%
CHF enrolment rate 54.0% 10.0%
Hospitals 2 1
Health centres 6 6
Dispensaries 60 61
Divisions 7 6
Wards 31 25
Villages 143 143
Health workers available 43.0% 37.0%
Shortage of health workers 57.0% 63.0%
Abbreviation: CHF, Community Health Fund.
performing district was based on the increased enrolments, 
retention of members, provision of benefit package to 
members, and management of the CHF funds. Iramba, the 
high performing district had CHF enrolment growing faster 
from 12% in 2009 to 54% in 2013. While Iringa district with 
poor performance had 1.7% of CHF enrolment in 2009 to 
10% in 2013. In terms of provision of benefit packages to 
members, in Iringa district services were limited to one 
health facility where members had registered while in Iramba 
district, CHF members could access services at any primary 
healthcare facility within the district. 
A sample of 78 respondents was used, 39 from each district. 
The sample was drawn from health providers, district health 
managers, and other health stakeholders in the two districts. 
The sampled respondents included members of the CHMT, 
CHSB, Health Facility Governing Committees (HFGCs), in-
charge of the health facilities, the Community Development 
Officer (CDO), and district CHF coordinators. Purposive 
sampling technique was used to select respondents. The 
main criterion for the selection of the participants was 
their involvement in the management of the CHF. Table 2 
summarises category of respondents in the two study districts.
In each district, 3 health centres and 4 dispensaries were 
purposively selected in consultation of the district health 
managers. The health facilities were selected mainly based on 
the geographical accessibility and operation of the CHF for at 
least 1 year. In Iringa district, health centres that were selected 
included Isimani, Kiponzelo, and Nzihi and dispensaries were 
Tanangozi, Kalenga, and Weru. In Iramba district, health 
centres that were involved in the research included Mgongo, 
Ndago, and Kyengege while dispensaries were Bomani, 
Mbelekese, and Misigiri.
Data Collection Techniques
Data were primarily collected by the first author using in-
depth interviews involving key respondents. The purpose of 
in-depth interviews was to collect information from a wide 
range of people who had first-hand knowledge about the CHF 
operations. A semi-structured interview guide was developed 
to assist the interviews with key respondents. The use of semi-
structured interview guide enabled participants to express 
their views and to elaborate on issues that they felt were most 
relevant and important. Interviews were carried out until 
saturation point was reached, meaning that no new concepts 
Table 2. Distribution of Respondents (N = 78)
Category of Population
Total
Iringa Iramba
CHMT 8 8
CHSB 4 4
Health providers at Health centre and dispensaries 7 7
Health centre committees 9 9
Dispensary committees 9 9
CHF coordinator 1 1
CDO 1 1
Total 39 39
Abbreviations: CHF, Community Health Fund; CHMT, Council Health 
Management Team; CHSB, Council Health Service Board; CDO, Community 
Development Officer.
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were emerging from the interviews. 
Data Analysis
In-depth interviews as well as minutes of the committee 
meetings were analysed using thematic approach. The unit 
of analysis was individual respondents as well as teams. The 
data analysis involved a number of steps. The data analysis 
firstly involved a process of familiarisation with the data by 
listening to the audio-recordings and reading the transcripts 
and notes from the minutes several times and noting ideas. 
Secondly, the first author developed a code manual based on 
the research objectives of the study. A list of initial themes 
was drawn up, based on the objectives of the study. The 
process of theme generation was reviewed and refined by 
going back and forth between the themes and the codes, as 
well as between the themes and the transcripts until the final 
themes were defined. We, therefore, employed both inductive 
and deductive approaches (mixed coding) to arrive to the 
themes. Thirdly, the transcripts of each interview were read 
through and responses were identified and were then coded 
manually in accordance with the identified themes. Fourthly, 
data were sorted and grouped together under patterns that 
were considered accurate, complete, and generalisable. As 
patterns of meaning surfaced, similarities and differences 
were identified. Finally, data were summarised and 
synthesised, retaining as much as possible the key expressions 
of respondents. After this analysis, data were triangulated to 
allow comparison across different categories of respondents.
Results
This section presents key findings of the study organised 
in five themes namely: characteristics of the district health 
managers; uptake of CHF in the study districts; personal 
initiatives of the district health managers to increase uptake 
of CHF; supportive mechanism exerted by district health 
managers; and motivation and incentive mechanisms.
Characteristics of the District Health Managers 
The age of the respondents ranged from 18 to 51. As indicated 
in Table 3, out of 16 district health managers, 75% were males 
and 25% were females. In terms of the level of education, 
38% out of 16 managers were diploma holders and 62.0% 
were degree holders. There was no difference in the level of 
education for the district health managers in the two districts. 
Even in terms of gender, there was no marked difference in 
the levels of education for the district health managers.
In terms of experience of stakeholders in the health sector, 
the findings did not reveal any huge difference among the 
two districts. As indicated in Table 4, 43% out of 16 had been 
working in the health sector over five years, and 19% had 
worked in the health sector between 1-2 years.
However, interview with CHF coordinators in both districts 
revealed difference in experience. In Iringa district, the CHF 
coordinator had only 1 year of experience. In addition, apart 
from being the CHF coordinator, he had to attend other duties 
concerning community development which greatly affected 
his performance as a CHF coordinator. 
“Due to my little experience, I should have been left to 
concentrate on CHF matters only. You know, coming in the 
office without knowing what you will exactly deal with, dwarf 
my experience and above all jeopardize CHF performance in 
the district” (IDI with CHF coordinator).
It was evident from the interviews that the duties of CHF 
Coordinator were too demanding and required enough time 
to handle them. These duties included preparing monthly, 
quarterly and annual reports and budget; coordinating all 
CHF-related activities in the district, ensuring proper filing 
and managing membership data, and provide technical 
support to the CHF stakeholders in the district. In Iramba 
district, the CHF coordinator had stayed in the position for 
4 years and was seen to have greater command of the above 
stipulated job descriptions. 
In terms of training and managerial skills, the findings 
indicate that the vast majority of the district health managers 
in Iramba district had attended some training on managerial 
skills. Likewise, in Iringa district, majority of the district 
health managers had attended training on managerial 
skills. The most cited managerial training courses included 
management and supportive supervision, health system 
management, human resources management, and health 
information management.
Uptake of the Community Health Fund in Iramba and Iringa 
Districts
CHF was introduced in Iramba district in 1998. In that year, 
5.5% of total households were CHF members. The registration 
Table 3. Demographic and Social Characteristics of the District Health Managers
Districts TotalIramba Iringa
Gender Gender
No. %Male Female Total Male Female TotalNo. % No. %
Age
18-29 1 0 1 12.5 1 1 2 25.0 3 19.0
30-40 2 2 4 50.0 2 0 2 25.0 6 37.0
41-50 2 0 2 25.0 2 0 2 25.0 4 25.0
51-60 1 0 1 12.5 1 1 2 25.0 3 19.0
Total 6 2 8 100.0 6 2 8 100.0 16 100.0
Education
Diploma 2 1 3 38.0 2 1 3  38.0 6 38.0
Degree 4 1 5 62.0 4 1 5 62.0 10 62.0
Total 6 2 8 100.0 6 2 8 100.0 16 100.0
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declined from 5.5% to 0.1% between June 1998 and March 
1999. Ten years later, that is in 2009, the CHF enrolment grew 
to reach 12.0%. Since then, the district has experienced drastic 
increase in the enrolment such that by 2013 the enrolment 
recorded 54% of CHF members.25 On the other hand, in Iringa 
district, CHF was launched in 1999 and in that year enrolment 
stood at 5%. Since then, there has been fluctuation in the CHF 
enrolment such that by 2009 enrolment drastically dropped to 
1.7%.31 Table 5 summarises trend in CHF enrolment in recent 
years in the two study districts.
Personal Initiatives of the District Health Managers 
The analysis of interviews revealed that in Iramba district 
there were a number of initiatives taken by the district health 
managers aimed at increasing the uptake of CHF compared to 
Iringa district. Such initiatives included monthly evaluation 
of CHF performance, formation of hypothetical households 
who join CHF, introduction of mobile CHF and referral 
system, overhauling CHF and user fee payment system as well 
as community sensitisation aimed at making people join CHF.
To start with, Iramba district conducted monthly review of 
CHF performance. This was done through monthly meetings 
involving HFCs. The MoHSW’s guideline requires that 
HFCs meet quarterly. In those meetings, the HFCs discussed 
achievements, challenges and prospects of CHF in their 
respective health facility and reports were submitted to the 
CHMT on a monthly basis. As a custom, CHMT met from 
first to fifth each month to discuss reports from each health 
facility. This was a pre-condition for the in-charge of a health 
facility to get a token, mostly transport allowance as well as 
per diem for one day. Health facilities whose reports were 
rejected were sternly warned and the in-charges of the health 
facilities were not given transport allowance and per diem. 
The vast majority of respondents reported that this initiative 
Table 4.  Experience in of the District Health Managers in the Health Sector
Experience in the 
Health Sector
Districts Total
Iramba Iringa
No. % No. % No. %
1-2 years 2 25.0 1 12.5 3 19.0
2-3 years 1 12.5 2 25.0 3 19.0
3-5 years 1 12.5 2 25.0 3 19.0
5 years 4 50.0 3 37.5 7 43.0
Total 8 100.0 8 100.0 16 100.0
Source: Field Data, 2014.
Table 5. CHF Enrolment Rates 2009-2013
District Year No. of Household
Registered 
Household
Percentage of Enrolled 
Household
Iramba
2013  43 756  23 756  54.0
2012  41 822  13 752  38.0
2011  39 756  8514  20.0
2010  37 889  6200  14.0
2009  36 001  5410  12.0
Iringa
2013  68 578 6230  10.0
2012  63 200 4758  6.9
2011  61 301 2681  3.9
2010  58 789  1662  2.4
2009 54 511 1230  1.7
Abbreviation: CHF, Community Health Fund.
Source: District CHF reports 2013/2014.
significantly increased enrolment of CHF in Iramba district. 
On the contrary, In Iringa district, respondents across all 
levels rarely reported initiatives taken to increase the uptake 
of CHF. It is not surprising that CHF enrolment in Iringa 
district was disappointingly low. 
Secondly, in Iramba, the district health managers formed 
hypothetical households who were obliged to join CHF. 
Respondents reported that elders who were unable to pay 
CHF premiums were grouped in 10s which formed one 
household and the village government paid on their behalf. 
Also primary and secondary school students were grouped 
into 10s and 5s, respectively. Each primary school student 
paid TShs 1000 per year (equivalent to US$0.5), and those 
of secondary school paid TShs 2000 per year (equivalent to 
US$1) making total of TShs 10 000 of a single household. 
Those who were working in informal sector like petty traders 
(Machinga) and motorcycle drivers (Bodaboda) also formed 
hypothetical household of 10s and then joined CHF quite 
smoothly. The findings from all respondents revealed that 
this initiative helped significantly in increasing the uptake of 
CHF in Iramba district. 
Thirdly, Iramba district’s attempt to introduce portable CHF 
and referral system were commended by respondents as an 
initiative that motivated members to join CHF. According 
to our respondents, in Iramba district, when CHF members 
got sick, they could access health services at any primary 
healthcare facility within the district. In terms of the referral 
system, CHF members were referred to the health centres and 
to the district hospital. It was found out that CHF members 
who were referred to the district hospital could utilize up to a 
maximum of TSh 20 000 (equivalent to US$10) from the CHF 
fund to cover expenses. The CHF members were required 
to pay additional costs, if any. In contrast, in Iringa district, 
the CHF benefits were limited to one primary healthcare 
facility (dispensary or health centre) closest to the residence 
of the member and were not transferable to other healthcare 
providers in the district.
Fourthly, Iramba district increased the rate of user fee 
payments in order to encourage households to enrol with 
CHF. The district council increased the amount of user fees 
from TShs 1000 to TShs 3000 at the dispensary level, and 
from TShs 1500 to TShs 4000 at the health centre. At the same 
time, the annual premium for the CHF was changed from 
TShs 5000 to TShs 10 000 per household. This initiative was 
taken by CHMT and approved by the Full Council in 2012. 
The vast majority of respondents reported that increase of the 
amounts of out-pocket payments significantly increased the 
enrolment to CHF. Commenting on the benefits accrued from 
overhauling payment scheme, one respondent remarked.
“From the day the payment scheme was overhauled, it is very 
rare to find patients who pay at the point of service delivery. 
Almost all of them are CHF members. We are now used to 
the truth that those who pay at the point of service delivery 
are mostly new comers to our district” (In-charge of the 
health facility). 
In contrast, in Iringa district, the payment scheme for CHF 
and user fees were found out to have remained the same for 
over 15 years since the introduction of CHF in 1999. The 
annual premium for CHF was TSh 5000 while the use fee was 
TSh 2000 per facility visit. The analysis of interviews with the 
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in-charges of the health facilities in Iringa district revealed that 
patients preferred to pay TShs 2000 to get treatment instead 
of paying TShs 5000 as CHF premium annually. According to 
the members of the HFCs, the vast majority of patients were 
not happy with the quality of health services provided in the 
primary healthcare facilities.
Furthermore, Iramba district had introduced an innovative 
and participatory sensitisation process. In Iramba, 
sensitisation was not only done by the members of CHMT, 
CHSB, or HFCs but also it encompassed all district council 
management team led by the District Commissioner (DC) 
and the DED. The analysis of interview with CHMT members 
revealed that CHF had been made a permanent agenda and 
so was widely discussed in formal and informal meetings. 
For example, every Friday heads of departments met with 
the DED to discuss various issues. The CHMT members 
reported that CHF was made a permanent agenda in those 
Friday meeting. The DC on his part had designed a slogan 
known in Kiswahili as “Kuku mmoja CHF mwaka mzima kwa 
kaya” meaning “selling one chicken enables a family to buy 
CHF premium for the whole year.” This slogan encouraged 
household members to keep chicken that would enable them 
to join CHF easily. Commenting on how sensitisation had re-
energised CHF uptake one respondent put it this way:
“Our success in CHF enrolment for three years now has not 
come by accident. Our sensitisation has penetrated the whole 
community. In Iramba, CHF is everywhere. Our hamlet 
chair persons, Village Executive Officers (VEOs), Ward 
Executive Officers (WEOs), Ward Councillors above all DCs 
and DEDs have done a commendable job” (IDI with a CHSB 
member).
In contrast, in Iringa, the vast majority of respondents 
reported that sensitisation was rarely carried out. Although 
CHMT mentioned it as a way of recruiting new members and 
retaining the old ones, it was reported as a dormant exercise. 
This was made clear by the CHSB members who argued that 
they had not been involved in any sensitisation exercises for 
two years since they were chosen. Similarly, the majority of 
the in-charges of the health facilities who were interviewed 
eloquently reported that they had confined their sensitisation 
exercise to what may be termed as “indoor sensitisation.” That 
is, they largely relied on the sensitisations done by the health 
providers at the health facility. 
Supportive Mechanism Exerted by the District Health 
Managers 
The study explored the extent to which health facility in-
charges are provided with support for effective implementation 
of CHF. It was evident from the analysis of interviews that in 
Iramba respondents felt satisfied with the support provided 
by the district health managers. Supporting mechanism that 
were said to be exerted to the health facilities included but 
not limited to constant encouragement of HSF who work in 
remote areas, continued coaching of HSF, regular visits of the 
district health managers to the health facilities, frequent and 
friendly communication between district health managers 
and HSF. On the contrary, in Iringa district the vast majority 
of the CHMT members felt that the support provided by the 
district health managers to the health facilities was inadequate. 
One respondent exemplified it this way: 
 “I don’t think we are delivering the needed support to our 
Health Facility Staff (HFSs). For instance, for a week now I 
have been seeing several in-charges coming to these premises 
asking for procedures of purchasing drugs since the drugs 
that had been sent by MSD was over, but no one attends 
them. You know, before being a CHMT member I was the in-
charge of a health facility and I experienced the same. There 
are times you really lose hope” (IDI with a CHMT member).
Motivation and Incentive Mechanisms
The findings revealed that both Iramba and Iringa districts had 
a system of motivating their HSF and health committees. The 
marked difference was evidenced in the type of motivation, 
consistency and modality that were used in implementing 
motivation and incentive schemes. 
Motivation Mechanism to Health Facility Staff 
The analysis of findings revealed that in Iramba, there was a 
clear schedule of providing motivation and incentive scheme 
to the HFSs contrary to Iringa. In Iramba district, it was 
evident that extra duty allowance was timely paid to HFS on 
a monthly basis based on their rank. Clinical officers received 
TShs 50 000, senior nurses received TShs 40 000 and auxiliary 
nurses were paid TShs 30 000. Additionally, on-call allowance 
was timely given on a monthly basis. Clinical officers were 
paid TShs 60 000 and nurses were paid TShs 30 000. When 
asked the extent to which they were satisfied with the 
incentives one respondent remarked this way: 
“I have worked in 5 different district councils to date. 
Sincerely, I have not seen the district council that pays extra 
duty allowance and on-call allowance timely like Iramba. 
I cannot keep this secret my brother; Iramba is exceptional 
when it comes to the question of motivating health providers 
(IDI with in-charge of health facility).
It was revealed that the CHF was the main source of fund 
which was used to pay incentives to health providers and 
district health managers as well as health committees. 
Iramba district was able to generate enough funds from CHF. 
According to the 2013/2014, Comprehensive Council Health 
Plan (CCHP), Iramba district had collected TShs 227 690 495 
from CHF in 2012/2013 and the district was expected 
to collect TShs 394 508 403 from CHF during 2013/2014 
financial year. In Iringa district, on the contrary, findings 
revealed that even though extra duty and on-call allowances 
were stipulated in the guideline, the exercise was constrained 
by irregularity in paying the suggested amount. This problem 
was compounded by the councils’ heavy reliance on the basket 
fund (donor funds). It was evident that there was frequent 
delay in the disbursement of the basket fund to the district 
councils. This largely affected the payment of incentives to 
the health providers, district health managers as well as HFCs. 
For instance, in the financial year 2012/2013, Iringa district 
collected only TShs 34 269 100 from the CHF. One CHMT 
member in Iringa district recounted:
“We have good plans that are, however, interfered by the 
government’s delay to disburse fund timely. Sometimes 
three months can elapse without receiving any coin from the 
government. How can we pay say on-call allowances under 
such circumstances? We are making all our efforts but we 
mostly prove failure” (IDI with CHMT member). 
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Motivation Mechanism to the Health Facility Governing 
Committees 
The findings revealed that both Iramba and Iringa districts 
had a system of motivating their health committees. 
Like health providers and district health managers, the 
marked difference was evidenced in the type of motivation, 
consistency and modality that were used in implementing 
motivation and incentive schemes. The analysis of interviews 
revealed that in Iringa, HFC members were paid allowance of 
TShs 5000 after each meeting which were convened quarterly. 
Thus, annually the HFGCs received a total of TShs 20 000. 
However, the findings further revealed that HFGCs did not 
get the allowance immediately after the meeting. Sometimes, 
the payment was delayed until the next meeting which largely 
affected morale of the committee members. 
In contrast, in Iramba district, payments for the HFGCs 
worked well. Committee members were paid after each 
meeting which was convened monthly. The chairperson and 
secretary of the committee were paid TShs 3000 and other 
committee members were paid TShs 2000. The committee 
members reported that they were paid immediately after the 
meeting. While the amount of allowance paid was reportedly 
small, the vast majority of the committee members felt 
satisfied and motivated. In addition, the fact that in Iramba 
the committees met monthly to discuss issues pertaining to 
the performance of their health facility and CHF in general, it 
largely increased the uptake of CHF. It needs to be noted that 
the MoHSW guideline stipulated HFGCs to meet quarterly. 
Additional meetings are held at the discretion of the respective 
district councils. 
Motivation and Incentives to the Council Health Service 
Board 
In Iringa district, the CHSB members were paid a flat rate 
of TShs 80 000 after every meeting which were normally 
convened quarterly. The analysis of interviews revealed that in 
Iringa district, the CHSB members rarely got an opportunity 
to visit health facilities. They largely waited for reports from 
CHMT who normally did supportive supervision to the 
health facilities. One CHSB member complained:
“I assure you, we have never visited any health facility. 
Believe me, this is my second tenure as a CHSB member. 
When I visit my nearest health facility for medical reasons, I 
am merely treated just like any other citizen because very few 
health providers know me as an CHSB member. 3-4 months 
can elapse without us engaging in any health-related matters 
until the meeting is convened. Under such a situation do 
you expect the CHF to perform better?” (IDI with CHDB 
member).
In contrast, the CHSB in Iramba district displayed outwardly 
enjoyment of their position in the district. In Iramba district, 
the chairperson and the secretary of the CHSB were paid 
TShs 200 000 while other members of the board were paid 
TShs 150 000 after each meeting which were normally 
convened quarterly. Additionally, when the CHSB members 
visited health facilities they were paid allowances. One CHSB 
member noted:
“We are so grateful to our district council for what they do to 
us, especially when we hear the cries that other CHSB face in 
other districts. The district has given us a wide room for us 
to perform our tasks without any interference. We are even 
privileged that when we attend medical care at Kiomboi 
hospital, we do not stand in queues.”
Discussion
This paper has described the experiences of the district 
and local level actors in implementing community health 
insurance in Tanzania. In this section, we expand on the 
key issues raised by the respondents with reference to other 
studies on the implementation of health policies in developing 
countries. 
The findings of the study did not reveal major differences 
among district health managers in the two study districts 
in terms of demographic characteristics of managers, 
management education and training, and management 
practices, although in the overall Iramba (the high 
performing district) scored slightly higher than Iringa rural 
(the low performing district) on some indicators. There were 
substantial differences in favour of Iramba district on one key 
indicator of leadership namely: personal initiatives of the top-
district level leaders and district health managers to get things 
done. 
It is evident that the variation in the uptake of the CHF 
reported in this study was largely attributed to personal 
initiatives of the top-district level leaders and the district 
health managers. This finding corresponds with earlier studies 
on decentralised district health management in developing 
countries.11,32 For example, a study done in Indonesia found 
out no major differences between the study districts in terms 
of demographic characteristics of managers, management 
education and training, and management practices. However, 
there were important differences in two key leadership 
indicators namely: personal initiatives to get things done and 
fairness in handling staff disciplinary matters.32 Nevertheless, 
the authors felt that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the assumption that the differences in performance of 
district health system were related to the differences in the 
performance of district health managers. 
However, qualitative studies done in Tanzania found out that 
managerial and leadership practices of the district health 
managers, including effective supervision and personal 
initiatives of the top-district health officials coupled with 
incentives, were the major factors for the good performance 
of the district health system.11,33 It was evident that in Iramba 
district the high rate of enrolment in CHF was largely 
attributed to the personal initiatives of the top-district 
leaders such as DED and the DC as well as the DMO. Such an 
initiative was seen in a number of ways like introduction of 
monthly evaluation of the performance for CHF, formation of 
hypothetical households, introduction of portable CHF health 
service package and referral system as well as overhauling of 
payment system. The CHF design in Iramba district which 
provided opportunity for the CHF members to access health 
services at any primary health facility in the district was more 
attractive. A recent study in Tanzania reported that people 
are usually mobile, which includes their occasional travelling 
from one place to another for various socio-economic or 
business commitments.34 This implies that the CHF design 
that requires members to access services in a fixed health 
facility which is closest to one’s place of domicile seems to be 
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inappropriate.
The high performance of CHF in Iramba district was also 
due to effective support mechanism that was rendered 
to the health facilities by the district health managers. In 
Iringa, CHF was affected by absence of laudable attempt to 
support the HSF. In districts like Iringa where the HSF were 
modestly supported by the district health managers, they 
suffered from what Marberry35 calls job-related stress which 
is associated with low level of job satisfaction, high rate of 
burnout, absenteeism and notoriously high hesitancy to serve 
the community. Studies have indicated that subordinates 
who lack support from their managers rarely put extra effort, 
are distracted from job performance and less motivated to 
perform beyond maximum requirement.36 In Iramba district, 
on the other hand, as CHF uptake kept improving, HSF and 
managers continued to be creative, reflective, enthusiastic 
and ambitious in ensuring that CHF enrolment continued 
to increase. Bradley et al37 report that in districts where HSF 
receive the needed support from their superiors, the HSF 
experienced sense of self efficacy, felt motivated and satisfied 
and consequently performed impressively in discharging 
their duties.
Although human motivation has been considered by 
psychologists to be a very difficult undertaking,38 a body of 
evidence suggests that where motivation has been consistently 
applied, particularly to the HSF and health committees, 
has resulted into higher achievement of set standards even 
beyond.39 This has been true with regard to CHF performance 
in Iramba district than in Iringa district. Findings in Iramba 
revealed that HSF as well as health committees enjoyed 
reasonable motivation. This presumably had an impact in 
improving the uptake of CHF. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Study
This study relied primarily on the review of minutes and in-
depth interviews with key actors involved in the management 
of the CHF in the study districts. The study focused on supply 
side factors that determine CHF performance (management 
and leadership from the supply side). We recognise that the 
demand factors such as household’s ability to pay may also 
influence the performance of the CHF. In addition, this 
study did not explore contextual factors in the two study 
districts which might also explain the observed differences in 
the performance of the CHF. Future studies could focus on 
both supply and demand side factors in order to understand 
better the actual practices of CHF scheme in Tanzania. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the study provides good 
insights into factors for the diverse performance of the 
community-based health insurance scheme in Tanzania. 
 
Conclusion
This paper was meant to explore the role of decentralised 
district health management and leadership practices on the 
uptake of community health insurance in Tanzania. The 
paper adds to the stock of knowledge on CHFs functioning in 
Tanzania where the practice is still relatively new compared 
to other countries in Africa and elsewhere. By comparing 
the best practices with the worst practices, the paper 
contributes valuable insights on how CHF can be scaled up 
and maintained.
The findings of this study provide insufficient evidence 
to support the assumption that the differences in the 
performance of the study districts in terms of uptake of CHF 
is related to the differences in the leadership and management 
practices and behaviours of the district health managers. 
No major differences were found among district health 
managers in the two study districts in terms of management 
and leadership skills and behaviour, although in the overall 
Iramba district scored slightly higher than Iringa rural district 
on some indicators. 
The variation in the implementation of the community 
health insurance scheme reported in this study suggests 
that district health managers and local leaders were able to 
exercise considerable discretion in the implementation of 
the CHF scheme. It is mainly due to the personal initiatives 
of the top-district health leaders, particularly the district 
health managers and local government officials which led to 
the variations in the performance of the two study districts 
in terms on the uptake of the CHF. Additionally, availability 
of health services, effective supervision mechanisms, and 
incentives for the HFCs and board members had significant 
impact on the performance of the districts. The policy-
makers, particularly the MoHSW and RHMTs, should 
strengthen supportive supervision mechanisms to the district 
health managers and health facilities. More important, there 
is need for the MoHSW to provide opportunities for the well 
performing districts to share good practices to other districts 
in order to increase uptake of the community-based health 
insurance. Furthermore, there is need for active collaboration 
between the district health managers and local level leaders 
such as councillors, ward and village leaders, as well as 
HFCs. These categories of actors are very important in the 
implementation of the policies. 
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